TRUMP'S THANKSGIVING MENU: TURKEY AND APPLESAUCE
Sigh, ten days ago I posted
an essay commenting on Acting Attorney General of the United States Matthew
Whitaker's statement that the worst decision in the history of the Supreme
Court was Marbury v Madison. To
demonstrate what a troglodyte that made Whitaker, my inner-lawyer prompted me
to discuss that case in the simplest terms I could muster, so that my
non-lawyer readers could follow my reasoning.
Well, I failed. I received
complaints, (including one from my wife), that my efforts to simplify were not good
enough.
So, for the purpose of this
note, let me reduce Marbury to its core. The Supreme Court held two
things:
1) If a statute [or an Executive Branch decree] is contrary to a Constitutional provision, the latter prevails because the
Constitution is supreme. Neither the Congress nor the President can legally enact
or declare a law or rule that is contrary to any provision of the Constitution.
If they want to overrule a
Constitutional provision, they must follow the Constitution's provisions
for amendment of the document.
Got that?
Therefore,
2) When a court is presented
with a challenge to the validity of a statute [or a decision by a member of the
Executive Branch], the court is obliged to decide the case pursuant the above
principle. If it finds that a statute or
decree is at odds with a provision of the Constitution, it must say so, and
declare the statute or decree to be illegal and unenforceable.
Marbury
is famous because it is the first, and the definitive Supreme Court decision
establishing and explaining this now universally accepted doctrine known as Judicial Review.
Whitaker thinks courts are an
inferior branch of the government,
and ought not have the power of Judicial Review. That would, of course, mean
that the President or the Congress could totally ignore the Constitution and we
would have no remedy short of violent revolution. We did that in 1776, but that
was to get out from under the thumb of a foreign King, not our own President.
Ok, now back to Trump's appointment of Whitaker. He is clearly
a Trump loyalist, and while that is troublesome because it threatens the
independence of the Department of Justice, (a branch of which is conducting a
criminal investigation involving Mr. Trump, his family, and colleagues,) I want
to focus back on Marbury v Madison.
Many lawyers, conservatives
and liberals alike, have attacked the Whitaker appointment because it has not been confirmed by the Senate and therefore violates Article
II of the Constitution, which reads:
"The President... by and
with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Officers of the United
States ... .
History and precedent have in
effect modified that language so that not every federal employee needs Senate
confirmation. Only "Principal
Officers" do.
What is a "Principal
Officer?" The Supremes tell us that means a person with "significant
authority." That means, says the Court, we look to
i) the importance of the issues in his
portfolio,
ii) the finality of his
actions, and
iii) the amount of discretion
he has on reaching his or her determinations.
So to look at Whitaker's
power visa-a-vis his control of the Mueller investigation, for example:
i) Absent recusal (which
ain't gonna happen) few things in his portfolio at the Department of Justice
are more important,
ii) Because he is at the top
of the department, his decisions are not reviewable by anybody in the
department. He reports only and directly to the President, and
iii) He has total discretion
to reject any proposed Mueller subpoena, indictment, or expenditure.
The Administration argues the
Whitaker appointment is authorized by a statute permitting "interim"
appointments of Principal Officers, and the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel argues that Whitaker is not really a Principal Officer because
his appointment expires in 240 days!
Moreover, it says, the government has, for many years, made interim appointments without Senate approval more than one hundred times!
All bullshit. I would love to
see Anton Scalia's response. He would say,
"Look he either is or he is not a
Principal Officer, whether for a day or a year. If he is, then he needs Senate
confirmation, and if a statute says otherwise, read Marbury v Madison. The Constitution is supreme and the
statute fails. And if past administrations have violated the Constitution by
applying this interim appointment statute, that certainly does not amend the
Constitution. No statute, of whatever vintage and how often utilized, trumps Article II. Any contrary argument
advanced by the Office of Legal Counsel is just plain applesauce."
A bientot.

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